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 A decade before the 2000 presidential elections, in a chapter omi-
nously entitled The Coming Constitutional Crisis, David Abbott and 
James Levine admonished that the Electoral College would soon pro-
duce a “wrong winner”—a President who wins the electoral count yet 
loses the popular vote.1 Whenever this happened, they predicted, the 
Presidency would face a profound crisis of legitimacy.2 Among critics 
of the College, the possibility that the College would produce a 
“wrong winner” has been held, like the sword of Damocles, over the 
heads of the current system’s supporters, who are too enamored of 
the Framers’ invention to appreciate the impending doom. 
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 1. DAVID W. ABBOTT & JAMES P. LEVINE, WRONG WINNER: THE COMING DEBACLE IN 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1-20 (1991). 
 2. Id. 
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 These dire predictions are hardly new. For critics of the Electoral 
College, the Achilles heel of the College is its ability to select a Presi-
dent that fails to win the popular vote. Moreover, and as a direct re-
sult of the close presidential elections in the last forty years, many 
students of the Electoral College have continually warned that the 
College would soon “malfunction” by producing a minority President. 
In response, reformers have introduced myriad proposals for changes 
in the Electoral College. These changes must be understood exactly 
within the larger historical context. “Close presidential elections, 
those in which the new president has only a narrow margin in the to-
tal popular vote,” Polsby and Wildavsky write, “always lead to re-
newed public discussion of the merits of the electoral college, since 
close elections remind people of the mathematical possibility that the 
candidate with a plurality of all the votes will not necessarily become 
president.”3 
 Those who foretold that the College would produce a wrong win-
ner were prescient in one respect: the 2000 presidential election, one 
of the closest and most exciting presidential contests in the history of 
our republic, did in fact produce a “wrong winner.” George W. Bush, 
the forty-third President of the United States, won the electoral 
count but lost the popular vote—an event that has only occurred on 
two previous occasions in American history.4 But, in their contention 
that the Presidency would suffer a crisis in legitimacy if the electoral 
count did not match the popular vote count, Abbott and Levine may 
be on the wrong side of history. The circumstances surrounding 
George W. Bush’s ascension to the Presidency defied warnings that 
such a state of affairs would give rise to “unrest, public clamor for re-
form and an atmosphere of crisis.”5 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the fire and brimstone forecasted 
by the naysayers have not come to pass, the Electoral College 
remains an unpopular institution. Unsurprisingly, particularly in 
view of the results of the 2000 presidential election, there have been 
many calls for reforming the Electoral College. Again, this is nothing 
new; calls for reform, perhaps abolition of the College altogether, 
have been made loudly and often since its implementation over two 
centuries ago.6 Relatedly, the proposals for reform have a distinctive 
                                                                                                                    
 3. NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES 
AND STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 245 (10th ed. 2000). 
 4. The two previous elections were the Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876 
and the Cleveland-Harrison election of 1888. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEIL R. PEIRCE, 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 27-28 (1999). 
 5. John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why it Ought to be Abolished, 37 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1968). 
 6. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 141 (1994) (“There is no exact account of the number of 
proposals and alternatives for electoral reform that have been introduced in Congress since 
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historical feel. The three perennial proposals are for direct election, 
for proportional distribution of electoral votes, and for a districting 
system.7 There have been some relatively fresh innovations, such as 
the National Bonus Plan.8 In general, suggestions for reform have 
been essentially the same. 
 In light of this constant barrage of criticism, an obvious question 
arises: how has the College managed to survive despite its lack of 
popularity, its opacity, and its generally controversial nature? Com-
mentators answer this question in three ways. First, and as with 
many of the institutions designed by the founding generation, one is 
initially tempted to ascribe the longevity of the College to the wisdom 
of that generation.9 As Robinson Everett wrote decades ago, 
“[o]ccasionally our political mythology seems to attribute an element 
of immutability and divine sanction to our electoral process—as if it 
had been ordained at Mount Sinai.”10 Yet, to the extent that the 
founding generation exhibited much wisdom in the design of many of 
our present institutions, the College hardly epitomizes such wisdom. 
A cursory glance at the historical record, which we undertake 
shortly, suggests as much. 
 A second possible explanation for the College’s durability looks to 
the force of history and tradition. Herbert Wechsler explained, “This 
difficulty shows why present methods have endured despite the 
magnitude of the objections to them: changes impinge in an incalcu-
lable fashion on the balance of advantage with which we are familiar 
and have learned to deal.”11 Additionally, in view of the fact that 
abolishing the College would ultimately necessitate a constitutional 
                                                                                                                    
the time of the Constitutional Convention. Estimates range from no less than 500 to over 
700.”). For the text of the various reform proposals, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM 
AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 97-
104 (1971). 
 7. See RICHARD L. BURRILL, CONTROVERSY OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM 22-23 (1975). 
 8. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, WINNER TAKE ALL: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON REFORM OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS 4-5 
(1978). Under this plan, each state plus the District of Columbia gets two extra votes, 
which are to be awarded to the winner of the popular vote. This plan would also abolish the 
office of electors and award Electoral College votes automatically. For those times when no 
majority is achieved, a runoff would take place between the top two candidates. Id.; see 
also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Fixing the Electoral College, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at 
A39. 
 9. For example, Hardaway states that though the Electoral College was “hailed as 
part of the ‘Grand Compromise,’ which included the equal representation of the states in 
the Senate, it in fact reflected far more—namely, the vision and genius of the constitu-
tional framers.” HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 14. 
 10. Robinson O. Everett, Foreword to The Electoral Process: Part I, 27 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (1962). 
 11. Herbert Wechsler, Presidential Elections and the Constitution: A Comment on Pro-
posed Amendment, 35 A.B.A. J. 181, 273 (1949). 
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amendment, a particularly onerous and generally difficult exercise, 
the inertia of the entrenched system should not be surprising.12 
 A third possibility, and the one that serves as our point of depar-
ture, looks to the foundation of our political structure and the nature 
of our democratic commitments. In this vein, we are particularly in-
trigued by the question of electoral legitimacy. To be clear, we are not 
interested in the question of legitimacy in and of itself. It is clear to 
us that the question of legitimacy—and more generally the larger 
debate surrounding the use of the College as the method of presiden-
tial selection—rests upon an infrequently articulated conception of 
democracy and an oft-debated notion of federalism. 
 In this Article, we contend that the debate over the Electoral Col-
lege masks two fundamental inquiries. The first inquiry deals with 
the extent of our constitutional regime’s commitment to democracy. 
We maintain that the Constitution reflects two competing under-
standings of democracy. In most areas of politics, our constitutional 
structure boasts a broad conception of democracy where the right to 
vote is paramount. The redistricting revolution may be catalogued 
under this broad banner. In contrast—and as Justice Scalia made 
painfully clear in his riposte to the dissenters’ disgust about the stay 
order of December 9, 2000—we treat presidential elections quite dif-
ferently.13 In this second area, the constitutional structure reflects a 
narrow conception of democracy where a constitutional right to vote 
for President and Vice President is nonexistent.14 
 The second inquiry explores the content and scope of our commit-
ment to federalism. The fundamental question here is one of self-
definition: who are we? To be sure, this is a very old question. It is 
also a very difficult question, one with which we continually grapple, 
even to this day. Put explicitly, to what extent are we fundamentally 
a collection of sovereign states? To what extent are we a nation with 
the interests of the states subsumed to those of the federal govern-
ment?15 
                                                                                                                    
 12. While the Amendment process is difficult, it is not impossible. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XII. 
 13. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046-47 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the issue was whether the votes that the Florida Supreme Court ordered to be 
counted were “legally cast votes,” not whether counting every legal vote would constitute 
irreparable harm). 
 14. Concededly, this is but a sketch of a much more complex relationship between the 
right to vote and our constitutional commitments. We explore some of the nuances and 
complexities below. 
 15. As Professor Farber stated in a related context, do we “prefer to pledge . . . alle-
giance to ‘One Nation’ or to a ‘Federalist System’ of interlinked republics[?]” Daniel A. Far-
ber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2000). 
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 Our position is grounded within the context of these two larger 
inquiries. That is, before we can meaningfully talk about whether the 
Electoral College is worth keeping or changing, we must first come to 
grips with the scope of our democratic commitments. We must also 
grapple with the nature of the compromise that we have struck be-
tween state and federal interest in presidential elections. Until we 
struggle with and come to appreciate these two crucial foundations of 
our democratic ethos, the Electoral College debate will continue to 
consist of recycled ideas that will continue to be rejected. 
 We discuss these and other issues in Part III. In Part II, we 
ground our discussion by presenting the leading arguments for and 
against the College. Before turning to the future, however, we look 
first to the past. In light of all that it teaches us about the institu-
tion, the history of the Electoral College is worth examining, even if 
over a few short pages. This is the task to which we turn in Part I. 
 Before proceeding, an important caveat is warranted. This Article 
is designed to frame the debate over the Electoral College and the 
right to vote. By design, this means that many more questions will 
arise than we are prepared to answer. For example, our discussion of 
the foundation of federalism, and particularly the view of states as 
“sovereign entities with dignitary interests,” gives rise to a number of 
interesting possibilities, some of which are addressed by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush v. Gore.16 Similarly, we also 
raise important questions about the existence of the right to vote in 
presidential elections in light of the modern reapportionment revolu-
tion post-Baker v. Carr.17 We recognize that many of these issues 
demand fuller treatment than we are capable of giving them in this 
format. As such, we simply flag them for the time being, nothing 
more. 
I.   LOOKING TO HISTORY 
 In his classic survey of American history and culture, Alexis de 
Tocqueville alluded to the inherent difficulties in designing a method 
from which to choose a national executive. As he wrote:  
 There is reason for criticizing the elective system, when applied 
to the head of state, in that it offers so great an attraction to pri-
vate ambition and so inflames passions in the pursuit of power 
that often legal means do not suffice them, and men appeal to force 
when they do not have right on their side.18 
                                                                                                                    
 16. 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).   
 17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 18. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (George Lawrence 
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1832). 
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The real issue, he explained, boiled down to this: “The problem was 
to find that mode of election which, while expressing the real will of 
the people, would least arouse their passions and leave them least in 
suspense.”19 
 Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 confronted these 
multiple difficulties.20 The number of proposals made at the conven-
tion, standing alone, provides a fairly accurate picture of the degree 
to which the manner and mode of selecting the executive raised some 
very difficult conundrums: Should the executive be chosen by Con-
gress, as in the original Virginia Plan;21 by popular vote;22 by the 
states through their executives23 or legislatures; by electors chosen by 
the people in districts within each state; or maybe by electors chosen 
by said legislatures?24 Similar difficulties arose about the nature of 
the office and its tenure. For example, should the Constitution insti-
tute a single executive elected by Congress for one term of seven 
years, as in the Virginia Plan;25 a plural executive elected by Con-
gress for one term;26 or, as Alexander Hamilton suggested in his long 
                                                                                                                    
 19. Id. at 132. 
 20. “It may be proper to remark, that the organization of the general government for 
the United States, was, in all its parts, very difficult.—There was a peculiar difficulty in 
that of the Executive.—Everything incident to it, must have participated of that difficulty.” 
Statement by James Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3 RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 331 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, 
RECORDS]. 
 21. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 64-69 (Madison’s journal). This 
method of selection was proposed on June 1 and approved the next day. It was soon dis-
carded as other procedures gained prominence. On July 17, election by Congress was ap-
proved ten to zero. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 22. On July 24, the delegates 
reintroduced the procedure, only to defeat it again in the coming weeks. Id. at 97-106. 
 22. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 80 (Madison’s journal). This method 
was raised early on but did not receive much support. The delegates returned to this 
method on July 17. After some debate, direct election was defeated nine to one. See 2 
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 32. Two days later, on July 19, direct election was 
reconsidered. Both Governeur Morris and James Madison advocated it. Id. at 51-59 (Madi-
son’s journal). In this vein, James Wilson explained that the “idea was gaining ground, of 
an election mediately or immediately by the people.” Id. at 56. On August 24, and while the 
convention examined the report of the Committee of Detail closely, it returned to this issue 
yet again. Direct vote was immediately rejected, nine to two. Id. at 397.  
 23. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 156 (Robert Yates’ journal). On this 
method, each governor would be given as many votes as the state had in the election of the 
Senate. Id. at 176 (Madison’s journal). The motion introduced by Elbridge Gerry was de-
feated ten to one. 
 24. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 32 (Madison’s journal). This proposal 
was rejected on July 17, by an eight to two vote. The delegates reversed their decision two 
days later and decided on selection by electors appointed by state legislatures. Id. at 58. 
This hardly settled the matter. On July 24, the electoral plan was reconsidered and ulti-
mately rejected; election by Congress was reinstituted. Id. at 101. Along these lines, Wilson 
suggested that fifteen members from Congress, selected by lottery, would subsequently 
choose the executive. Id. at 103.  
 25. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 230. 
 26. See id. at 244 (Madison’s journal). This plan was ultimately rejected on June 19. 2 
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 50.  
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speech of June 18, a single executive chosen for life by electors se-
lected by the people in districts?27 These various possibilities were 
proposed but rejected often, and some resurfaced a number of times. 
Ultimately, the delegates settled on a single executive and the now-
familiar idea of the Electoral College.28  
 The concept of the Electoral College arose fleetingly during the 
midsummer of 1787. Early in June, James Wilson raised the possibil-
ity of filling the executive office through the appointment of elec-
tors.29 Alexander Hamilton made a similar proposal on June 18.30 
Both proposals were either ignored (in the case of Hamilton’s) or 
handily defeated.31 On July 17, Luther Martin raised a motion for the 
election of the executive by electors appointed by the state legisla-
tures.32 His proposal was defeated overwhelmingly.33 At this time, the 
convention instead unanimously approved a proposal whereby the 
executive would be chosen by the national legislature.34 And yet, the 
debate did not end there. Two days later, on July 19, Oliver Ells-
worth put forth a proposal similar to Martin’s.35 This second time, the 
proposal was approved by a vote of eight states to two.36 This vote 
hardly ended the matter. Ultimately, the Committee of Eleven37 met 
on August 31. On September 4, it proposed what became the Elec-
toral College.38 
 Our discussion thus far is intended to illustrate, if briefly, the de-
gree to which the convention members struggled with their available 
alternatives. As James Wilson remarked during the ratification de-
bate in Pennsylvania, “The Convention, sir, were perplexed with no 
part of this plan so much as with the mode of choosing the President 
of the United States.”39 The difficulties were such as to provoke Max 
Farrand to comment more than a century later: “Whatever difficul-
                                                                                                                    
 27. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 292 (Madison’s journal). 
 28. The delegates agreed on a single executive and reelection on July 17. Id. at 22.  
 29. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 80 (Madison’s journal). 
 30. Id. at 300 (Yates’ journal). 
 31. See id. at 81. 
 32. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 32 (Madison’s journal). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 22. 
 35. Id. at 57-59. 
 36. Id. at 58. 
 37. The Committee of Eleven, as the delegates were called, included eleven states: 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Id. at 496-97 (Madison’s 
journal).  
 38. Id. at 481, 496-503 (Madison’s journal). 
 39. 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 511 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., reprint ed. 1987); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 132 (“The first of these objects, as respects the Ex-
ecutive, was peculiarly embarrassing. . . . [For] tedious and reiterated discussions took 
place.”). 
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ties might have been encountered in other directions, they paled into 
insignificance in comparison with the problem before the convention 
of determining a satisfactory method of electing the executive.”40 This 
specific debate raged on until September 1787, when the delegates 
finally arrived at, or perhaps stumbled into, a compromise.41 These 
issues are ably documented elsewhere and we need not reproduce 
those efforts here.42 For our specific purposes, three questions are 
worth exploring. First, how did the delegates solve the difficult ques-
tion of presidential selection? Second, why did they choose this spe-
cific procedure? And third, what were the pitfalls inherent in such a 
plan? 
 The first question simply demands a close look at the constitu-
tional text.43 On its face, the text is fairly clear. States, by any way 
                                                                                                                    
 40. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160 
(1913); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 48 
(4th rev. ed. 1957) (“On no problem did the Convention of 1787 expend more time and ef-
fort than on devising a suitable method of choosing a President.”); Wechsler, supra note 11, 
at 181, 182 (“It is consoling to remember that the problem that gives us our difficulty is the 
one the Framers found it hardest to resolve.”). 
 41. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Jan. 14, 1825), in 3 FARRAND, 
RECORDS, supra note 20, at 464 (explaining that the Electoral College had been adopted as 
a compromise between the small and large states). This is not to denigrate the institution 
itself, of course, for, as Corwin wrote, “With no other feature of the Constitution did they 
express greater satisfaction than with the method finally devised.” CORWIN, supra note 40, 
at 48. 
 42. See, e.g., JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 41-87 (1979); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN NO MAJORITY RULES: THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1992); TADAHISA KURODA, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1787-1804 (1994). 
 43. The relevant portions of the Constitution read in full: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may di-
rect, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress; but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for [two 
Persons], one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state 
with themselves; they shall [make a List of all the Persons voted for], and of the 
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes 
shall then be counted,—the Person having the greatest number of votes for 
President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed; and if [two or more candidates have such a ma-
jority, and have an equal number of votes, then] the House of Representatives 
shall choose immediately, by ballot, [one of them for] President[; and if no Can-
didates have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the House shall 
in like manner choose the President.] But in choosing the President, the votes 
shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a 
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds 
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their legislatures deem proper, will select a number of electors to cast 
two votes for the office of the President. In this vein, each state will 
receive a number of electors equal to their number of representatives 
in the national legislature.44 From these votes, the person with the 
highest number will be anointed the President while the runner-up 
will become the Vice President.45 Yet, two preconditions remain to be 
met. First, the winning candidate must attain a majority of all bal-
lots cast.46 If no such majority is secured, the House of Representa-
tives will choose a President from among the top five candidates in 
terms of electoral votes, with each state delegation casting one vote.47 
Second, in those rare cases when an electoral majority is in fact 
achieved but the leading candidates receive an equal number of 
votes, the House of Representatives will similarly choose a President 
from among the two candidates.48 
 The second question—why the delegates chose this specific proce-
dure—follows directly from the first and asks about the intentions of 
the delegates in devising the Electoral College. Three leading ex-
planations arise from this question. The first explanation looks to the 
difficulty faced by the convention delegates in arriving at a widely 
accepted solution. As customary, Madison’s words, written a genera-
tion later, provide a helpful guide. In a letter to George Hay, Madison 
remarked on “[t]he difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process 
for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government such as that of 
the U.S., was deeply felt by the Convention.”49 It may be said that the 
delegates had reached an impasse and, more troubling yet, the reper-
cussions of their inability to reach a common ground were serious. 
Thus, Madison continued, “and as the final arrangement of it took 
place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not exempt from a de-
gree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and impatience in 
all such Bodies: tho’ the degree was much less than usually prevails 
in them.”50 Plain and simple, the delegates were tired and ready to go 
home. As such, the Electoral College is not just a compromise, but a 
compromise borne of exasperation and in an atmosphere where a 
                                                                                                                    
of the states and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [In 
every case, after the choice of the President,] the Person having the greatest 
number of votes [of the Electors] shall be the Vice-President[. But if there 
should remain two or more who have equal votes,] the Senate shall choose 
[from them by ballot] the Vice-President. 
Id. amend. XII. 
 44. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in 3 FARRAND, 
RECORDS, supra note 20, at 458. 
 50. Id. 
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“best” plan might not be as palatable as a “good” plan.51 On this read-
ing, and to put it mildly, the genesis of the Electoral College is rather 
inauspicious. 
 A second (and much more promising) explanation posits these 
electors in a position of complete independence, expected to deliber-
ate freely about the needs of the nation and the qualifications of the 
various candidates. A cursory look at the relevant text does much to 
support this interpretation. To begin, states are authorized to ap-
point electors, who may be neither a Senator nor a Representative, 
nor, more importantly, a “person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States.”52 This requirement has generated some 
litigation and its meaning remains uncertain;53 yet, on its face, it 
raises some very interesting issues. For example, why is it that the 
electors cannot be those who are either federal officials or persons 
holding offices of “trust”? A very plausible answer is, simply, that the 
electors must be encouraged to think independently, to weigh all 
relevant information, and to choose accordingly. 
 Also, note how the electors must meet in their particular states 
and vote for two persons, one of whom must not be an inhabitant of 
their same state. These requirements point in two analogous direc-
tions. For one, the fact that the electors must meet with one another 
supports the view that they would be independent of public opinion 
and prior constraints; they would be free to decide anew and choose 
any two persons they deemed fit. And yet, the delegates knew that 
regional ties would play a big role. Thus, electors could not make 
both choices based on state residence. 
 This view finds further support from some very respectable 
sources. We know, for example, the extent to which the delegates 
worried about the independence of the executive. Thus, each time 
that motions for the choice of popular selection for the President 
were raised, they were quickly defeated.54 Similarly, Publius explains 
in Federalist 68 that “the immediate election should be made by men 
most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and 
acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judi-
cious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were 
                                                                                                                    
 51. “I have found no better way of selecting the man in whom they place the highest 
confidence,” Madison argued at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, “than that delineated in 
the plan of the convention.” Statement by James Madison at the Virginia Convention 
(June 18, 1788), in id. at 329-30. See CORWIN, supra note 40, at 31 (“For this portion of the 
Framers’ work the only thing to be said is that it no doubt represented their conscientious 
belief that they had done the best they could in the circumstances.”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 53. See, e.g., Sheboygan Co. v. Parker, 70 U.S. 93 (1865); In re George H. Corliss, 11 
R.I. 638 (1876); Commonwealth v. Binns, 17 Serg. & Rawle 219 (Pa. 1828). 
 54. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 32, 402 (Madison’s journal). 
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proper to govern their choice.”55 This is a view that finds support in 
modern times from well-respected quarters. In his dissenting opinion 
in Ray v. Blair, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote: “No one faithful to 
our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is 
implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an 
independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified 
for the Nation’s highest offices.”56 
 A third explanation posits instead that the voters would follow 
their state biases, and as such the Electoral College was designed in 
a way that would neutralize these natural tendencies. Tadahisa Ku-
roda explains: “Rather than disinterested citizens, the framers an-
ticipated individuals who would in general express the views, inter-
ests, and biases of their communities and states in the office of presi-
dential elector.”57 This view also finds substantial support in the con-
stitutional text; electors, after all, must cast at least one of their two 
votes for a candidate who “shall not be an Inhabitant of the same 
State with themselves.”58 On this competing view, electors will not 
deliberate with like-minded public servants in search of the public 
good; instead, regional interests will lead them to choose state and 
local interests over national ones. The constitutional text clearly re-
flects this worry. 
 The third question—what are the inherent pitfalls of the Electoral 
College scheme—proves far more interesting, especially in light of 
the historical record. On its face, either of the two rationalizations for 
the electoral requirements under Article II appears possible. On ei-
ther account, it is clear that the convention delegates envisioned that 
individual “candidates” would be chosen by these electors and that 
once all votes were tallied, the best two men would come to occupy 
                                                                                                                    
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1457, at 321-22 (1833); see also CORWIN, supra note 40, at 40 (delegates intended for elec-
tors to “exercise their individual judgments in the choice of a President”); JOHN J. PATRICK 
ET AL., THE OXFORD ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 167 (Berkeley ed. 2000) 
(stating that electors are free agents “diligently searching to find the best candidates for 
President”). Compare Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the 
Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665 (1996) (agreeing that electors are free agents, yet also 
agreeing that states have the power to bind electors and make them pledge how they will 
vote), with HARDAWAY, supra note 6 (arguing that the convention delegates never ex-
pressed such a view during the convention debates, even if many advocates made such an 
argument during the ratification debates). 
 56. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Feerick, 
supra note 5, at 9 (“The evidence is compelling that the Framers envisioned a system un-
der which persons of the highest caliber would be chosen as electors.”); John D. Feerick, 
The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.B.A. J. 249, 254 (1968). 
 57. KURODA, supra note 42, at 12. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.  
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these important offices. This vision, however, failed to account for a 
crucial element of American politics: the concept of party politics.59 
 The argument goes something like this. On the plan as codified in 
Article II,60 electors would use their votes on those individuals they 
deemed as best qualified for the office of national executive. Conced-
edly, the delegates assumed that the electors would be partial to 
their regions’ preferred candidates. As such, they were given two 
votes. For the second vote, “each elector was expected to vote inde-
pendently according to his own best judgment.”61 But there was 
more. These assumptions of both partiality and independence led 
some of the delegates to the further view that a candidate would sel-
dom receive a majority of the votes.62 And whenever they did not, the 
Constitution provided that the House of Representatives would de-
cide the election, with each state delegation receiving one vote.63 
 On this model, the electors would independently evaluate the pro-
spective “candidates.” As such, the likelihood of having any one can-
didate achieve a majority was theoretically small, while the concomi-
tant role of the House of Representatives was correspondingly 
higher. That is, from the top five candidates in terms of electoral 
votes, the House would often decide the election. This was a strongly 
held view among the delegates; although, in all fairness, it was not 
universally shared.64 Yet, what were the chances, really, of candi-
dates failing to garner a majority of electoral votes? In the delegates’ 
defense, it may be said that they suspected that some semblance of 
party politics, however rudimentary, would creep into the presiden-
tial electoral process. This is why, in the rare instance that a major-
ity of electoral votes is attained yet two candidates receive an equal 
number of votes, the House “shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of 
them for President.”65 For such a scenario to take place, however, it 
would require strict party discipline. Either that, or a great deal of 
luck. The election of 1800, and the electoral tie between Thomas Jef-
ferson and Aaron Burr, provides a fitting example.66 The Twelfth  
                                                                                                                    
 59. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 182 (“Whatever abstract merit was possessed by the 
idea of independent electors, the rise of parties swiftly made the concept obsolete.”). 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-4. 
 61. FARRAND, supra note 40, at 167. 
 62. Id. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.  
 64. See HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 81-82. While this might be true as a descriptive 
matter, it was not so normatively. Madison expressed the view at the convention, for ex-
ample, that he “considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part of 
the Legislature improbable.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 513 (Madison’s jour-
nal). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 66. To be sure, the Founding generation’s derision for the concept of parties is well es-
tablished. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LE-
GITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969) (especially chapters 2 and 
2001]                          ELECTORAL COLLEGE 891 
 
Amendment was ratified in order to remedy this problem.67 
 Further, what should be made of the role played by the House of 
Representatives? One argument is simply that this was the best way 
to appease the smaller states, as they would control the ultimate 
election.68 A competing argument, borrowing on an earlier position, 
would expect the House to behave with a regional gloss, though they 
were also expected to rise above the “mischiefs of faction.”69 These 
men, after all, would be “a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom 
may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriot-
ism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary 
or partial considerations.”70 If and when the election came to them, 
they would rise above faction and regional outlook. They would rise 
above politics. 
 As is evident from this Part, we must be careful when expressing 
support for the Electoral College on originalist grounds. Too often, 
commentators appear wedded to the so-called “wisdom of the found-
ing fathers” in devising this institution71 when, in truth, the evidence 
is equivocal. At best, the convention delegates stumbled upon the 
College as a compromise early in September 1787, in a small commit-
tee and while the constitutional convention was drawing to a close. 
We also know that this was one of the most difficult choices faced by 
the delegates. The best defense we have is Madison’s position that 
“no better way” than the Electoral College was found.72 This is hardly 
                                                                                                                    
and 3). And yet, we know that the concept of party politics, if embryonic when compared 
with our mature political system, arose in some form soon after the Constitution went into 
effect. This, Richard Hofstadter argues, is “the primary paradox” of his inquiry into the 
rise of the American party system. He explains: “Jefferson, the . . . co-founder, of the first 
modern popular party, had no use for political parties. . . . [T]he creators of the first Ameri-
can party system on both sides, Federalists and Republicans, were men who looked upon 
parties as sores on the body politic.” Id. at 2. The election of 1800 and the Twelfth Amend-
ment must be understood exactly within this context. 
 67. Instead of granting electors two votes to be cast on any two candidates of their 
choice, and from which the two leading candidates would become President and Vice 
President, the Twelfth Amendment asked electors to vote specifically for a President and a 
Vice President. In this way, candidates from different parties would not have to serve to-
gether, as with President Adams and Vice President Jefferson after the election of 1796. 
Also, the likelihood that the contingency plan would play a role, with the House of Repre-
sentatives deciding the election, was seriously diminished. Seen as a whole, these changes 
may be viewed as turning away from a romanticized view of electors as above party and 
pointing toward a descriptive view of political combat where winning is all that matters. 
See Wechsler, supra note 11, at 182. 
 68. HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 82. 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 70. Id. at 82. The representatives will “possess the most attractive merit and the most 
diffusive and established characters.” Id. at 83. Additionally, the representatives will have 
“enlightened views and virtuous sentiments.” Id. at 83-84. 
 71. See HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 11. 
 72. Statement by James Madison at the Virginia Convention, 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, 
supra note 20, at 329; see also 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 111 (Madison’s 
journal). 
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a ringing endorsement. It is precisely on those grounds that some 
concluded that the College has outlived its usefulness.73 
 Moreover, the compromise that the delegates agreed upon at the 
convention reflected certain assumptions about popular democracy 
and the appropriate sphere of operation for both state and federal 
governments. The point is not that the compromise and values upon 
which the College rests are necessarily ones that we share today. 
Rather, the argument is simply that the College is best understood 
by reflecting upon the assumptions that gave rise to its inception. 
These are issues that we explore in the next Part. 
II.   THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN MODERN TIMES 
 “Suggestions of substitutes for the electoral college system,” wrote 
Alexander Bickel a generation ago, “have abounded throughout our 
history. The college is, after all, complex, seemingly anachronistic—a 
curiosity; and it has alternated between being the butt of humorists 
and the concern of reformers.”74 Bickel is right on both accounts. The 
first point, about the many calls for reform, is amply supported by 
the historical record. The direct method of selection, whereby the 
President is chosen on the basis of a national election, was first con-
sidered at various times during the constitutional convention.75 Myr-
iad reasons led to its defeat on successive occasions.76 Congress first 
considered its merits in 1816 to no avail.77 Direct popular election of 
the President has been the most popular choice of reformers over the 
                                                                                                                    
 73. See Feerick, supra note 5, at 42-43; Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Re-
thinking Article II, Section I and Its Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our 
Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 
201, 204 (1994) (arguing that the Electoral College was a compromise designed to appease 
slaveholding interests and as such should be abolished). In 1979, the U.S. Senate held ex-
tensive debates on this issue, yet the proposal was ultimately defeated by a fifty-one to 
forty-eight vote. 125 CONG. REC. 17,766 (1979); S. REP. NO. 96-111, at 3-4 (1979). 
 74. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 10; see also William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repair-
ing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 149 n.24 (1996) (documenting various reform 
proposals made through the years). 
 75. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 29-31, 56-57, 111 (Madison’s journal).  
 76. Its opponents argued, for example, that this method was impracticable, 1 
FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 20, at 135 (Madison’s journal); that the people were too lit-
tle informed and thus liable to deception, id. at 137; and that the people were never fully 
informed and would vote for the same man within their own states, thus giving large 
states a much larger influence in the election, id. at 392 (Yates’ journal). Finally, the fear 
existed that the people would be duped by cabals, such as the Society of Cincinnati. Id. at 
454. It was obvious to all that such societies should not have a predominant influence in 
the government. See id. at 456. Further complications existed. For example, they argued 
about what to do with the slave question and other sectional problems, id. at 413, as well 
as what to do about the population disparities among the various states. Id. at 452.  
 77. NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 161 (rev. 
ed. 1981). 
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years.78 The District System and the Proportional Plan have played a 
similar role in discussions of electoral reform. The former was first 
introduced in 1800, the latter in 1848.79 As with the plan for direct 
election, both of these proposals have received much support through 
the years.80 
 The second point on the anachronicity of the Electoral College is 
also an accurate assessment of the critical commentary. Much has 
been written about the College and very little of the commentary has 
been complimentary. In this section, we do not wish to add to the list; 
in fact, we are not sure that anything new could be added to any such 
list. Rather, this second Part acknowledges that no discussion of the 
Electoral College is complete without revisiting the proposals for re-
forming or abolishing the College as well as the arguments of the de-
fenders of the College. We thus divide this Part into two sections. In 
the first, we discuss the four virtues the present system is said to 
have. In the second, we discuss four of the most common criticisms of 
the institution. In so doing, we also present some of the many reform 
proposals under discussion, past and present. This Part concludes 
with a cautionary note. While critics of the College do not entirely 
persuade us, we are also less than satisfied with the explanations 
provided by the College’s defenders. Before advancing these argu-
ments, which we do in Part III, we first examine the College itself, 
both the good and the bad. 
A.   The Good College 
 Defenders of the Electoral College system make four basic claims 
in support of retaining this institution. First, they point to the gene-
sis of the institution and the problems and conditions faced by those 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL REFORM 4 (1967) (“While there may be no perfect method 
of electing a President, we believe that direct, nationwide popular vote is the best of all 
possible methods.”); Birch Bayh, Comment, Reflections on the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. 
REV. 333 (1968); Ronald A. Dubner, The Electoral College: Proposed Changes, 21 SW. L.J. 
269 (1967); Paul A. Freund, Direct Election of the President: Issues and Answers, 56 A.B.A. 
J. 773 (1970); William T. Gossett, Electing the President: New Hope for an Old Ideal, 53 
A.B.A. J. 1103 (1967). But see JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE 
PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1971); Albert J. Rosenthal, Some 
Doubts Concerning the Proposal to Elect the President by Direct Popular Vote, 14 VILL. L. 
REV. 87 (1968). 
 79. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 77, at 132, 144. 
 80. See, e.g., Walter Clark, The Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage, 65 U. PA. 
L. REV. 737 (1917); Estes Kefauver, Proposed Changes in the Presidential Election System, 
1 VAND. L. REV. 396 (1948); Sen. John J. Sparkman, Comment, Reflections on the Electoral 
College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 338 (1968); Wechsler, supra note 11, at 270; William Raspberry, 
Post-Traumatic Suggestion, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2001, at A23.  
 On districting, see Sen. Karl E. Mundt, Comment, Reflections on the Electoral College, 13 
VILL. L. REV. 336 (1968). The leading criticism of this plan is that it would open the door to 
gerrymandering. CORWIN, supra note 40, at 52; Clark, supra, at 747. 
894  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:879 
 
in charge of its creation. “It happens that,” Alexander Bickel wrote, 
“somewhat like the Senate, the electoral college can satisfy, at once, 
the symbolic aspirations and distant hopes of the small states, and 
the present, practical needs of the large ones. Not many human insti-
tutions work out as artistically as that.”81 
 Second, a particularly powerful defense of the Electoral College is 
grounded on the need for certainty soon after the close of the particu-
lar election. Put in general terms, Judith Best argues that “an elec-
toral system should produce a definite, accepted winner and avoid 
prolonged contests and disputes that create uncertainty and public 
turmoil.”82 This is the function now played by the Electoral College. 
To its defenders, it does so in two ways. One, it saves the nation 
“from the effects of an ambiguous outcome.”83 In this way, it confers 
the requisite legitimacy even in the face of close elections.84 And two, 
it also “protect[s] the nation from the crisis of a disputed election.”85 
It is for this reason that proposals for direct election of the President 
are seen as particularly problematic. Once certainty is seen as impor-
tant, it is clear that a system of direct election will make close elec-
tions less certain, not more.86 Presently, litigation need only take 
place on a state by state basis; what if we needed to recount on a 
countrywide basis?87 
 Third, the College forces candidates to flatten their level of sup-
port. As Corwin explains, “[t]he truth of the matter is that, in the ab-
sence of a strong third party, the electoral system serves very well 
just as it stands at the present moment to guarantee that the candi-
date with the stronger popular following will win out.”88 
 A final argument in favor of the Electoral College looks simply to 
the historical record. “There are several reasons,” Clinton Rossiter 
wrote decades ago in the context of the Electoral College, “all of them 
convincing, why we should hesitate a long time before replacing a 
humpty-dumpty system that works with a neat one that may blow up 
in our faces.”89 Alexander Bickel echoed this sentiment. He wrote: 
                                                                                                                    
 81. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 10. 
 82. BEST, supra note 78, at 210; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 163 (“The asset 
that is priceless in a free and peaceful society is a clear and prompt result in the election of 
the national leader.”). 
 83. HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 127. 
 84. But see Robert D. Brown, NO—The Electoral College Should Not Be Abolished, in 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 212 (Gary L. Rose ed., 2d. ed. 1994). 
 85. HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 136. 
 86. BEST, supra note 78, at 204 (“[T]here is no reason to believe the direct-election 
plan would increase the certainty in any close election.”). 
 87. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 32. 
 88. CORWIN, supra note 40, at 52. 
 89. CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 199 (2d. ed. 1960); see BICKEL, 
supra note 6, at 3 (“The sudden abandonment of institutions is an act that reverberates in 
ways no one can predict, and many come to regret.”). 
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“We do well to remain attached to institutions that are often the 
products more of accident than of design, or that no longer answer to 
their original plans, but that challenge our resilience and inventive-
ness in bending old arrangements to present purposes with no out-
ward change.”90 Similarly, Martin Diamond states, “We should pre-
serve the electoral college . . . simply on grounds of its nearly two-
centuries long history of tranquil popular acceptance.”91 This is a po-
sition shared by many.92 
B.   The Big, Bad College 
 The Electoral College has been the subject of much scholarly 
commentary, a lot of it critical. In light of its inauspicious beginning, 
this should not be surprising. This section discusses four leading 
charges against the College. 
1.   Faithless Electors 
 We begin with one of the least compelling criticisms of the Elec-
toral College, the “faithless elector” problem. A “faithless elector” is 
an elector who “takes it in his head to act independently” and votes 
for a presidential candidate other than the winner of their state’s 
presidential election.93 The argument, taken seriously, is this: if a 
“voter has a constitutional right to cast an effective vote for Presi-
dent, an elector who casts his ballot contrary to the voters’ mandate 
may be said to be acting under color of state law to deprive the voters 
                                                                                                                    
 90. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 3. 
 91. Martin Diamond, The Electoral College and the American Idea of Democracy, in 
AS FAR REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT: ESSAYS BY MARTIN DIAMOND 2 (William A. 
Schambra ed., 1992). 
 92. See CORWIN, supra note 40, at 66 (relying on “[t]he verdict of actual practice”); 
WALLACE S. SAYRE & JUDITH H. PARRIS, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 2 (1970) (“[T]he burden of proof lies heav-
ily upon those who would eliminate known defects of the electoral college system but risk 
the hazards of untested alternatives.”); William R. Keech, Background Paper, in WINNER 
TAKE ALL: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON REFORM OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS 68 (1978) (“The discussion about election systems is col-
ored by the fact that the status quo is the Electoral College, which, in spite of risks and 
close calls has not produced a major malfunction for almost 100 years. This record pro-
duces a sense of security for its defenders.”); see also BEST, supra note 78, at 216, 218: 
 The present electoral system is not perfect. To cure all its defects may be be-
yond present skill. 
 . . . . 
 [And yet] [j]udged in terms of its practical effects, our electoral system has a 
sound heart. Like all living things, it has imperfections and defects, but it func-
tions; indeed, it thrives. Those who focus on its blemishes, real or imagined, 
advocate major surgery in the pursuit of abstract perfection, preferring logical 
consistency to viability. Major surgery is not indicated if we prefer life to logic. 
 93. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 34. 
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of that constitutional right.”94 This is another way of saying that, 
since 1796, electors have become “party dummies.”95 Their role is but 
limited to registering the preference of state voters at large, nothing 
more.96 
 There are many reasons the faithless elector problem is one of the 
least captivating defects—if indeed it is a defect—of the Electoral 
College. As a point of departure, the faithless elector problem is often 
described as a “specter”; throughout the history of the College, 
“faithless electors” have not surfaced often. Longley and Peirce report 
that “since 1796 fully 21,291 electoral votes have been cast for presi-
dent, but only nine votes in all those years were indisputably cast 
‘against instructions.’”97 The statistical probability that a faithless 
elector would cast a decisive vote in a presidential election is ex-
tremely low.98 Hence, the argument is about possibility, not 
probability. 
 Second, remedies for the “faithless elector” are readily available. 
As a matter of procedure, only those who are most committed to the 
party are selected as electors. Additionally, many states have passed 
statutes compelling electors to strictly vote for the presidential 
nominee of the party of their choice.99 Further, if the faithless elector 
does become a significant problem, it can be fixed by the simplest 
amendment to the Constitution, the automatic vote.100 That is, in-
stead of choosing electors as a bridge between the popular vote and 
the Electoral College, proposals have been made to assign electoral 
votes to the winning candidates automatically.101 Moreover, it is open 
to question whether the electors were intended to act as free agents, 
independent of the public’s opinion within their corresponding 
states.102 Finally, and as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bush v. Gore 
                                                                                                                    
 94. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1968); see also Lawrence D. Longley, YES—The Electoral College 
Should be Abolished, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 
84, at 204.  
 95. CORWIN, supra note 40, at 40. 
 96. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 55, at 167. 
 97. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 4, at 113. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Developments in the Law—Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1152 (1975).  
 100. See Diamond, supra note 91, at 191.  
 101. This particular provision came to be known as the Katzenbach Amendment. See 
Electoral College Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong. 274 
(1970) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).  
 102. For an argument that the electors were so intended, see Feerick, supra note 5, at 
8-9. For the contrary view, see LUCIUS  WILMERDING, JR., THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1958); 
John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
799, 810-11 (1961). 
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made vastly clear, a constitutional right to vote for President is sim-
ply nonexistent.103 
2.   Inspiring “Respect and Acquiescence” 
 For a second criticism, we look to none other than James Madison. 
“Next to the propriety of having a President the real choice of a ma-
jority of his Constituents,” he wrote to George Hay in 1823, “it is de-
sirable that he should inspire respect & acquiescence by qualifica-
tions not suffering too much by comparison.”104 To be sure, the popu-
lar vote is the simplest and most accepted way to chose a representa-
tive, and the chief executive is no exception. Yet, absent that, the 
chosen person must “inspire respect & acquiescence.” 
 Unlike Madison, we are not quite as worried with the qualifica-
tions of the chosen executive; perhaps our recent history leaves us a 
bit cynical to ask for too much. Instead, we worry more about the fact 
that, unsurprisingly, many Americans do not fully understand how 
the Electoral College works.105 As an ABA commission on electoral re-
form concluded, the College is “archaic, undemocratic, complex, am-
biguous, indirect, and dangerous.”106 In this vein, others have gone as 
far as to call it “a deplorable political institution.”107 The fact that a 
majority of Americans do not understand how the Electoral College 
works is potentially problematic. After all, this is the process by 
which we select our President and nothing short of the legitimacy of 
the incoming President potentially hangs in its balance. 
 Defenders of the institution concede this point rather willingly, at 
least at first glance. Martin Diamond, for example, writes that:  
Perhaps the fear is that voters are baffled by the complexity of the 
Electoral College and that their bafflement violates a democratic 
norm. It must be admitted that an opinion survey could easily be 
devised that shows the average voter to be shockingly ignorant of 
what the Electoral College is and how it operates.108 
And yet, these concessions lead him away from the expected conclu-
sions, for, as he proceeds, “[i]t all depends on what kind of knowledge 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has no federal con-
stitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until 
the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to 
appoint members of the Electoral College.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §1)). 
 104. Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, 
supra note 20, at 458. 
 105. See infra note 112. 
 106. Electing the President: Recommendations of the American Bar Association’s 
Commission on Electoral College Reform, 53 A.B.A. J. 219, 220 (1967). 
 107. Longley, supra note 94, at 200. 
 108. MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF 
DEMOCRACY 13 (1977). 
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the voter is expected to have. . . . However ignorant they may be of 
the details of the Electoral College, their ignorance does not seem to 
affect at all the intention and meaning of their vote, or their accep-
tance of the electoral outcome.”109 
 Diamond raises a second objection, one grounded specifically in 
the republican tradition and our system of government. The Electoral 
College, he maintains, is “only one example of the complexity that 
characterizes our entire political system. Bicameralism is complex; 
federalism is complex; judicial review is complex; the suspensory ex-
ecutive veto is a complex arrangement; the Bill of Rights introduces a 
thousand complexities.”110 Thus, he asks, “[i]f a kind of prissy intelli-
gibility is to be made the standard for deciding what should remain 
and what should be simplified in American government, how much 
would be left in place?”111 
 Much can be said for Diamond’s position. Most Americans pay 
very little attention to politics. In general, the political knowledge of 
the average American is rather limited.112 Taken together, these two 
premises lead to our present condition over the public’s understand-
ing of the Electoral College. That is, the fact that many people mis-
understand the workings of the Electoral College is undoubtedly a 
function of the attention that the average American devotes to poli-
tics and the minimal level of political knowledge of the electorate as a 
whole. 
 In response to this condition, one may argue that the fact that 
many Americans are unaware of how the College works undermines 
the legitimacy of the incoming President or of the electoral system as 
a whole.113 We do not think so. An electoral institution may be said to 
undermine the legitimacy of the winning candidate in a case where 
political elites have deliberately conspired together for the purpose of 
coercing the electorate to accept an institution that it would not oth-
erwise accept. Such is not the case here. Thus, the question is 
whether a “long-standing constitutional arrangement”114 is undemo-
cratic simply because it is complex. On this score, we agree with 
                                                                                                                    
 109. Id. at 14. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. To be sure, political scientists have debated quite vigorously the extent of this 
knowledge. See generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); PHILIP E. 
CONVERSE, THE NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS IN MASS PUBLICS (1962); ROBERT E. LANE, 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: WHY THE AMERICAN COMMON MAN BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES (1962); 
JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992). 
 113. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One 
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2549 (2001) (concluding that the Electoral Col-
lege as presently constituted is “less attractive” because its operation is not sufficiently 
transparent).  
 114. Diamond, supra note 91, at 187. 
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Diamond, who asserted that institutional simplicity is not the sine 
qua non of democracy.115 
3.   Ideological Purity, the Minority President, and Contingencies 
 A third argument against the Electoral College looks to the le-
gitimacy of the institution and modern democratic understandings. 
To some commentators, the Electoral College should be abandoned in 
favor of a direct election system not simply because of voter confusion 
and ignorance but on the grounds that selection by popular vote is 
the more legitimate democratic alternative.116 To be sure, when the 
electoral count and the popular vote count are convergent and ele-
vate the same presidential candidate to the Presidency, concerns 
about electoral legitimacy are largely an academic exercise. The 
worry, however, is that at some point—such as the 2000 presidential 
election—the two counts will diverge and the legitimacy of the incom-
ing President, if not the Presidency itself, will be implicated. 
 Not surprisingly, the critics have spilled most of their ink exactly 
here. There are two variations of this criticism. This first variation is 
primarily directed at the contingency plan—the established proce-
dure were a candidate unable to garner the requisite electoral votes. 
As we know, such a scenario would send the election to the House of 
Representatives, where each state delegation would cast one vote.117 
To some, this is the feature of the electoral system “that has been 
most condemned.”118 At its most extreme, this procedure may allow 
one person to cast the deciding vote in an election—a decision that is 
clearly “distasteful in a democracy.”119 As such, “steps should be 
taken to prevent their recurrence.”120 Even defenders of the College 
concede some ground here; Diamond, for example, has labeled the 
prospect of an election decided by the House of Representatives a 
“horror.”121 
 The second variation—and more popular criticism—even has its 
own name: Senator Kefauver has labeled the possibility that the 
Electoral College votes and the popular vote do not match the 
                                                                                                                    
 115. See id. 
 116. See supra note 78. 
 117. Kefauver, supra note 80, at 398. 
 118. J. Hampton Dougherty, The Law of the Constitution in Relation to the Election of 
President, 14 AM. LAW. 21, 23 (1906). 
 119. Richard C. Baker, On Becoming President by One Vote, 48 A.B.A. J. 455, 456 
(1962). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Testimony of Martin Diamond at a hearing of the Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion of the Committee of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, regarding an amendment pro-
posed by Senator Birch Bayh to eliminate the Electoral College and provide for direct elec-
tion of the President (1977), reprinted in MARTIN DIAMOND, TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 9 (1977) [hereinafter Testimony of Martin Diamond]. 
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“Loaded Pistol to Our Heads” problem.122 Abbott and Levine have 
similarly likened the election of an executive who has not won a ma-
jority of the popular vote to the “Great San Andreas Earthquake.”123 
Representative Emanuel Celler, while Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, described the electoral process resulting in a 
minority President as “horrible,” “unsporting,” “dangerous,” and 
“downright uncivilized.”124 John Feerick forecasted that “resentment, 
unrest, public clamor for reform and an atmosphere of crisis would 
probably ensue”125 “if the popular-vote winner were to lose a presi-
dential election.”126 
 The advent of Baker v. Carr127 and the “one person, one vote” revo-
lution128 frames this particular criticism of the Electoral College. 
There are two ways understand this argument. First, and as Neal 
Peirce and Lawrence Longley write, “[t]o lose their votes is the fate of 
all minorities, and it is their duty to submit; but this is not a case of 
votes lost, but of votes taken away, added to those of the majority, 
and given to a person to whom the minority is opposed.”129 The sec-
ond point is much simpler. As Alexander Bickel explained a genera-
tion ago: “It is time for the system to be ideologically pure. The Court 
has said that the Constitution commands equal apportionment. We 
should, therefore, reapportion the presidency.”130 In light of the his-
                                                                                                                    
 122. Id. at 5. 
 123. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 1. 
 124. 115 CONG. REC. 24,963 (1969). 
 125. Feerick, supra note 5, at 1.  
 126. Id. Professor Paul J. Piccard argued that “even the winning party is going to be 
sufficiently embarrassed to accept direct popular election of the President. I think they will 
turn to that.” PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 77, at 166 (quoting Nomination and Election 
of President and Vice President and Qualifications for Voting: Hearing before the Comm. on 
the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments, 87th Cong. 31, 501 (1961)); 
see also BEST, supra note 78, at 26-27 (“The principle underlying the charge that the pre-
sent system may result in the victory of a runner-up is that democratic legitimacy requires 
a guarantee that the candidate with the most popular votes will win.”); Longley, supra note 
94, at 208: 
This problem is a fundamental one—can an American president operate effec-
tively if he or she clearly has received fewer votes than the loser? I would sug-
gest that the effect upon the legitimacy of a contemporary American presidency 
would be disastrous if a president were elected by an obscure electoral college 
after losing in the popular vote. 
 127. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 128. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1964) (stating that election systems 
should give equal weight to each vote cast). 
 129. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 77, at 131 (quoting Missouri Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton, 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1824)); see Longley, supra note 94, at 200. 
 130. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 14; see Estes Kefauver, The Electoral College: Old Re-
forms Take on a New Look, 27 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 188, 188 (1962); see also Wechsler, 
supra note 11, at 184 (“There is no longer room for difference on providing federal protec-
tion of the popular participation in the choice. Time has made the Fathers’ difficulty on 
this issue wholly academic.”). 
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tory of the College and specifically its precarious inception, this is an 
argument worth thinking about. 
 From these perspectives, the question presented is rather simple: 
is the Presidency less legitimate if the Electoral College process pro-
duces a wrong winner? Supporters of the College have offered a 
number of responses. We examine the three most persuasive de-
fenses. First, defenders of the College point out that a “runner-up” 
Presidency would be mostly a “fluke.” As such, the possibility of a di-
vergent vote is hardly a source of concern, for simply, “[t]he Ameri-
can people would grin and bear it and throw him [the “runner-up” 
President] out the next time, if they did not like what he did. Flukes 
happen. . . . [T]hat is as close to Russian roulette as a pimple is to 
cancer.”131 
 Second, commentators question the reflexive coupling of American 
democracy with majority rule. Hardaway argues, for example, that 
“[a] winner in the Electoral College who fails to win the most popular 
votes is no more a ‘wrong president’ than legislation passed by the 
Senate is the ‘wrong legislation,’ or an amendment passed by the 
States (and not by popular vote), is the ‘wrong amendment.’”132 
Polsby and Wildavsky similarly argue that “there is no serious rea-
son to quarrel with the major features of the present system, since in 
our form of government ‘majority rule’ does not operate in a vacuum 
but within a system of ‘checks and balances.’”133 
 Third, one could question the criticism over the legitimacy of a 
minority Presidency on its own merits. Two such responses are par-
ticularly attractive. The first response argues that the institution of 
the Electoral College affects campaigning across the country and in 
so doing makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to know how a candi-
date who does not win the popular vote would fare under a different 
system.134 On this view, it is unfair and ultimately inaccurate to 
separate the popular vote from its particularized electoral context. 
Plainly, the argument concludes, the popular vote is a distorted and 
ultimately useless measure.135 The second response looks to the func-
tion played by the Electoral College, particularly after a close elec-
tion. Alexander Bickel notes, for example, that: 
                                                                                                                    
 131. Testimony of Martin Diamond, supra note 121, at 9. 
 132. HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 121. 
 133. POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 3, at 252; see also Brown, supra note 84, at 221-
22 (contending that the College preserves important principles, such as federalism, minor-
ity rights, and republicanism). 
 134. See HARDAWAY, supra note 6, at 121-22. 
 135. See Brown, supra note 84, at 212-13 (stating that the Electoral College method of 
electing the President is democratic and constitutional because it safeguards minority 
rights). 
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When some 70 million votes divide so closely, only an immensely 
dogmatic majoritarianism would insist that the so-called winner 
has the sole legitimate claim to office. In truth, there is a standoff, 
and all that is needed is a convenient device—any convenient de-
vice previously agreed upon—for letting one of the two men gov-
ern. That is all that is needed, and that is all that is possible.136 
 These defenses are persuasive at least in one respect. They under-
score the fact that legitimacy in presidential contests is not simply 
outcome-determinative. The supposition of illegitimacy presupposes 
an outcome-determinative conception of legitimacy: the presidential 
process is legitimate only if it produces the right outcome.137 In this 
case, “right” is defined as the outcome determined by the popular 
vote count. But that is precisely the question: should the popular vote 
count provide the normative baseline for judging whether the presi-
dential election procedure identified in the Constitution138 is suffi-
ciently democratic? 
 In this context, democratic legitimacy is both outcome-dependent 
and process-dependent. If the rules of the game are described ex ante 
and the parties play by these rules, then any outcome is by definition 
legitimate. The fact that the Electoral College may produce a “wrong-
winner” is part of the expected outcome as defined by the rules of the 
game. Put simply, the rule of decision is that the “person having the 
greatest number of votes . . . shall be the President, if such number 
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed.”139 
 The controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election is use-
ful to illustrate this point in a less abstract manner. The fact that 
George W. Bush lost the popular vote did not seem to terribly un-
nerve the general public. The public accepted the result of the elec-
toral count once the legal challenges were exhausted because there 
was a sense that the selection of George W. Bush was part of the ex-
pected outcome.140 
                                                                                                                    
 136. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 31. 
 137. Neal Kumar Katyal, Florida’s Election Day Vote Could Be Irrelevant, at 
http://www7.cnn.com/2000/LAW/11/columns/fl.katyal.florida.11.09/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2001) (“Basic popular sovereignty principles underlying our constitutional system argue 
that the people’s vote should govern.”). 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 139. Id. 
 140. There are undoubtedly other factors that contributed to the acceptance of the re-
sults of the 2000 presidential election. For example, many Americans accepted the result 
because they were not terribly excited about either candidate: it made less difference to 
them which candidate won. Though we would agree with this observation, our point is 
slightly different here. Our argument is simply that what it means to “win” an election 
cannot simply be defined as the result of the popular vote. Fundamentally, we are commit-
ted to two definitions of what it means to win a presidential election: one method defines a 
winner as the person who received the most popular votes; another defines a winner as the 
person who received the most electoral votes. A certain number of Americans reconciled 
themselves to the fact that George W. Bush rightfully assumed the mantle of President not 
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 In contrast, the reaction to the Bush Presidency in the African-
American community differed markedly from that of many White 
Americans. Some commentators criticized African-American leaders 
for publicly announcing that they will not accept the result of the 
election on precisely the grounds mentioned above—that the result 
was democratic because it was part of a democratically expected out-
come. However, African-American leaders responded that they were 
rejecting an outcome that they would have conceded ex ante was le-
gitimate. Rather, they argued that the outcome was not legitimate 
because the rules of the game were not followed. 
 Thus, though there may not be agreement about whether the 
proper procedures were followed in the 2000 presidential elections, 
there is widespread agreement about the ground rules: When the 
proper procedures are followed, the outcome cannot be contested. In 
other words, in a society committed to democratic rule, systemic out-
comes are by definition democratic when those outcomes are the 
product of preexisting commitments. 
 Even if one concedes this point to the defenders of the current sys-
tem, however, their defense is nevertheless unsatisfying. The ques-
tion posed is a normative one: whether electing the President by 
popular election is, as a normative matter, more democratic than the 
current system. The answer that the current system is democratic or 
that popular election is not the sine qua non of democracy does not 
resolve the normative inquiry. This answer does not speak to the 
question of comparative “democraticness.” We will return to this 
point in Part III. Before doing so, we discuss one last criticism of the 
Electoral College institution. 
4.   Unit Voting 
 A common criticism often offered in favor of the eradication of the 
Electoral College is that the College diminishes the voting power of 
various political minorities, including both voters of color and voters 
who support third-party candidates. The criticism is essentially that 
the winner-take-all system or unit rule unnecessarily “wastes” votes, 
particularly when compared to a districted-vote system or a direct-
vote system. 
 The argument is disarmingly simple. The unit-voting system em-
ployed by most states—which is not constitutionally required—
“wastes” votes whenever the unit winner wins by a greater margin 
than necessary to carry that unit.141 The votes are considered wasted 
not simply because they represent an unnecessary marginal excess, 
                                                                                                                    
because they enjoyed the outcome but because they accepted that the outcome was part of 
the game. 
 141. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 24. 
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but because the excess margins could make up the difference in an-
other unit that the candidate lost.142 Similarly, the unit vote rule also 
wastes the votes of the unit loser. Even though the unit vote loser 
was able to win some votes, because the losing candidate did not 
carry the unit, he or she does not get any electoral votes. Conse-
quently, the voters who voted for that candidate “wasted” their vote, 
especially if their candidate was from a third party. 
 a.   The Electoral College and Third Parties.—Let us first think 
about the Electoral College’s impact on third parties before we exam-
ine the College’s impact on voters of color. The unit vote system, as 
opposed to a proportional system, does in fact make it more difficult 
for political minorities to win electoral votes. When the unit is de-
fined as the “state,” which it is in every jurisdiction with the excep-
tion of Maine and Nebraska, political minorities will find it more dif-
ficult to carry the unit. The unit rule is one reason that third parties 
have found it nearly impossible to break the hold that the Republican 
and Democratic parties have had on presidential selection. 
 Appendix Table 1 shows how Ross Perot’s third-party candidacy 
fared in 1992. As is evident from Table 1, 19,741,657 Americans 
voted for Perot. Unfortunately for the Perot supporters, Perot carried 
nary an electoral vote. From this perspective, 19,741,657 Perot voters 
wasted their votes. 
 Appendix Table 2 demonstrates how a Perot candidacy would 
have fared under a proportional distribution system. Under a propor-
tional distribution system, Perot would have garnered 102 electoral 
votes. Even though Perot could not have acquired sufficient electoral 
votes to win the Presidency, he and his party could have played a 
significant role in who would eventually become President. In many 
respects, the current system minimizes the role that third parties 
can play as brokers and kingmakers in presidential politics. 
 In making this claim, we must underscore the fact that the solu-
tion here is not achieved by changing the size of the unit but by get-
ting rid of the winner-take-all feature of the electoral system. Thus, 
                                                                                                                    
 142. Of course, most states award all of the electoral votes to the candidate that wins 
the state—the unit—even if only by a mere plurality. Abbott and Levine explain one of the 
possible scenarios that the winner-take-all system gives rise to wasted votes in the follow-
ing way: 
[I]magine that the winning candidate carried the twelve largest states (and 
their 279 electors) by narrow 10,000 vote margins in each of those states. Thus, 
the winner’s total plurality in those twelve states was 120,000 votes. However, 
our winner lost the remaining states overwhelmingly, by an average of 100,000 
votes per state. The other candidate’s plurality in those thirty-eight states 
would, therefore, be 3,800,000. Thus, although the losing candidate received 
3,680,000 more votes nationwide, the other candidate would win the electoral 
college vote 279 to 259! 
Id. 
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in this circumstance the debate is not really about the unit rule as 
much as it is about the benefits of proportional representation over a 
first-past-the-post system.143 
 Further, note that the unit role provides a certain amount of sta-
bility to the system and underscores the importance of two-party 
politics to the constancy of the current system. Without the unit rule, 
a third party or third-party candidate of reasonable political strength 
would almost always prevent either of the two major parties from 
getting an Electoral College majority. 
 A third-party candidate’s impact does not necessarily depend upon 
capturing 20 percent of the electorate’s imagination as Perot did in 
1992. Appendix Table 3 illustrates that even if a third-party candi-
date secures 10 percent of the popular vote as Perot did in 1996, the 
third-party candidate can prevent either major party candidate from 
attaining an Electoral College majority. Thus, under a proportional 
distribution system, Perot could have prevented or delayed Clinton’s 
Presidency in 1996. 
 In sum, the unit rule does have a disproportionately negative im-
pact on supporters of third-party candidates. Compared to a propor-
tional distribution system, the unit rule minimizes the voting power 
of third parties. In exchange, the unit rule provides some stability to 
the two-party system. This is a feature that, while many find virtu-
ous, others find accursed.  
 b.   The Electoral College and Voters of Color.—Though the impact 
of the current system on third parties is quite clear-cut, the impact of 
the College on voters of color is not. In this section we examine the 
oft-stated assumption that the Electoral College is inherently biased 
against voters of color.144 We conclude that the Electoral College is 
not inherently biased against voters of color. In fact, the College fa-
vors some voters of color, particularly Latinos and Latinas, and dis-
advantages others, especially African Americans living in the South. 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the College invariably 
and directly disadvantages voters of color, even African-American 
voters who reside in the South, qua voters of color. Rather, the evi-
dence suggests that where the College disadvantages voters of color, 
                                                                                                                    
 143. We thank Heather Gerken for this observation. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1095 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining the “First Past the Post” or plural-
ity vote system). 
 144. See, e.g., ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 90-99; LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra 
note 4, at 154-61; Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution 
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College and the Representation of Minorities, in THE PRESIDENT & THE PUBLIC (Doris A. 
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this is because they live in a state that is disadvantaged by the Col-
lege.145 
 Many commentators have stated that the Electoral College re-
duces the voting potential of voters of color.146 For example, Abbott 
and Levine note that African Americans, particularly those residing 
the South, “find themselves typically casting votes for president that 
have virtually no influence on the electoral votes of their states.”147 
The proposition that the political preferences of voters of color, par-
ticularly African Americans, are disproportionately and negatively 
affected by the Electoral College has gained increasing and wide-
spread acceptance in both scholarly and popular circles.148 
 Some scholars argue that the Electoral College disadvantages vot-
ers of color because of the predominance of the unit-vote or winner-
take-all method of selecting electors employed by the overwhelming 
majority of states.149 As we noted earlier, a consequence of unit-
voting is the submergence of the votes of political minorities where 
the political preferences of voting minorities diverge with those of po-
litical majorities.150 As a result of the unit rule, African Americans—
specifically African-American voters in the South who vote over-
whelmingly for the Democratic Party—are more often than not sub-
merged because they are surrounded by White voters who vote over-
whelmingly for the Republican Party.151 Unless the presidential elec-
toral preferences of African Americans who reside in the South coin-
cide with those of their Southern White neighbors,152 they will seldom 
select a presidential elector. Consequently, as described by one com-
mentator, the vote of African Americans in the South is “virtually 
meaningless in the final selection of the President.”153 
                                                                                                                    
 145. See Omdahl, supra note 144, at 62 (explaining how presidential candidates place a 
premium on voters depending on their location; thus, the College may disadvantage voters 
of color based purely on the location where they reside).  
 146. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 93, 109-10; GLENNON, supra note 42, at 71-72. 
 147. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 93 (“Black Southerners’ presidential votes 
have been meaningless and without any political impact whatever.”); id. at 94 (“[S]outhern 
Blacks have had little more influence on most modern presidential general elections than 
Bulgarians. Their votes, although technically cast, have usually not counted.”).  
 148. See, e.g., id.; GLENNON, supra note 42. 
 149. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 4, at 137. 
 150. Id.  
 151. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 93. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 936; see also ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 93 
(“The cause of . . . [Southern Blacks’] electoral impotence is the fact that Southern Blacks 
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 The impact of the Electoral College’s winner-take-all system on the votes of Southern Af-
rican-American voters has at least led one commentator to conclude that states, with the 
exception of Maine and Nebraska of course, violate the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) by em-
ploying the unit-vote system to select presidential electors. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 
947, 1020. 
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 Taking this criticism on its merits, there are no empirical reasons 
to believe that unit-voting invariably minimizes the electoral 
prospects of voters of color. There is support for the proposition that 
unit-voting minimizes the votes of African Americans in the South.154 
This is because African Americans, who are a political minority and a 
distinctively liberal minority on some issues, are surrounded by the 
most politically conservative voters in the country—White voters in 
the South. As long as African Americans in the South remain politi-
cally liberal and are numerical minorities, and Whites in the South 
remain politically conservative, African Americans will continue to 
cast “wasted” votes in presidential elections. 
 As Longley and Peirce document, the Electoral College dispropor-
tionately affects the relative voting power of African-American voters 
compared to other groups and the electorate as a whole.155 Signifi-
cantly, Peirce and Longley explain that African Americans are disad-
vantaged by the Electoral College not because they are African 
                                                                                                                    
 154. Abbott and Levine argue that the Electoral College minimizes the voting strength 
of Northern African Americans. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 90-91. But they do not 
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method, Longley and Peirce aim to determine whether the College benefits small states or 
large states. 
 Longley and Peirce’s analysis is conducted in three stages. First they determine the 
chance that each state has in casting the crucial bloc of electoral votes in the College. Sec-
ond, they calculate the different combinations by which a citizen, by changing her vote, can 
determine the winner of her state’s electoral slate. They then combine the results of the 
first two steps to ascertain a voter’s chance of affecting the outcome of a presidential elec-
tion by casting the determinative vote given that her state’s electoral slate will determine 
the winner of the election. 
 From this analysis, Longley and Peirce conclude that a voter in California—the state 
whose citizens have the greatest relative voting power—has 2.66 times the potential for 
determining the outcome of a presidential election than a voter from Montana—the state 
whose citizens have the least voting power. Id. at 153-54. Longley and Peirce also conclude 
that even though the College benefits the smaller states by essentially awarding them a 
minimum of three electoral votes, irrespective of their population, the largest states benefit 
the most from the current system as a result of unit voting. Id. at 153. The classic study of 
voting power is John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the 
Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968). 
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Americans, but on the basis of their geographic concentration and 
distribution throughout the United States.156 This is because African 
Americans are largely concentrated in the South, and Southern 
states are disadvantaged by the Electoral College.157 Thus, Black dis-
advantage is ancillary to the inherent geographic biases of the Elec-
toral College and is due to the stochastic element that is geographic 
distribution. 
 The criticism that the unit-vote system depresses the votes of po-
litical minorities masks a more fundamental division. The unit-vote 
debate is really an argument about what should constitute a proper 
“unit” for presidential elections. On one level, the argument is 
whether the proper unit is a state or a congressional district. But on 
a more fundamental level, the argument is whether the proper unit 
is a state or the whole of the United States. 
 Viewed from this perspective, the unit-vote debate clearly raises 
questions about our national commitment to a certain conception of 
federalism. To what extent are we fundamentally a collection of sov-
ereign states? To what extent are the interests of the states sub-
sumed to that of the national or federal government? We take up 
these questions in the last Part. 
III.   ELECTIONS AND LEGITIMACY 
 The debate over the Electoral College’s legitimacy can be recast as 
an argument favoring the abolition of the College on the grounds 
that our conception of democracy has evolved beyond that of the 
founding generation and the era of the Electoral College’s debut. On 
this argument, it may be said that popular election is now more im-
portant than it once was. Similarly, some may argue that our concep-
tion of federalism has also correspondingly changed and that the fed-
eral government should play a stronger role—and the states a lesser 
one—in presidential elections. These positions link both contentions 
about unit voting and democracy: the question is whether the indi-
vidual, the state, or the federal government is the fundamental en-
tity within which lies democratic legitimacy. Put differently, how do 
we apportion political rights between these three entities? And of 
                                                                                                                    
 156. LONGLEY AND PEIRCE, supra note 4, at 158 (“The differences in voting power arise 
because people live in different states, not because of differences in race.”). It is worth not-
ing that we are not making light of the fact that the Electoral College disadvantages some 
voters of color, in this case, African Americans. We recognize that residential segregation 
is not a random event but often the product of state-sponsored racism. African Americans 
came to the South by force and not by choice. Our only point here is to point out that the 
College negatively affects African Americans who live in the South, but it also negatively 
affects everyone else who lives in the South. Moreover, as we point out, the College has a 
positive effect on racial groups, including African Americans, who live outside of the South. 
 157. Id.  
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those three entities, which one should be the ultimate bearer of po-
litical rights? 
 We contend that the debate over the Electoral College is grounded 
on two basic commitments about the nature of our democratic ex-
periment: federalism and the right to vote. The latter commitment is 
quite strong and encompassed by the slogan “one person, one vote.”158 
Its constitutional moorings are suspect. In contrast, the commitment 
to states’ rights and our federal structure has much less pull but im-
peccable constitutional foundations. In many respects, these com-
mitments stand in conflict with one another. The crucial question is: 
which commitment trumps the other? The debate over the Electoral 
College has raged on for as long as it has, in great part, because a 
resolution to this question has proven very difficult. 
 Our national struggle with this particular question should not be 
surprising. Undoubtedly, the Electoral College, as currently consti-
tuted, reflects a compromise made at its founding that a certain bal-
ance is needed between state and federal interests. Similarly, we as a 
contemporary political society also struggle, albeit to a lesser extent, 
with demarcating the proper line between state and federal interests. 
That struggle has not changed. 
 Relatedly, our conception of the right to vote differs dramatically 
from that of the founding generation. Arguably, this newfound ap-
preciation comes as a direct result of the Court’s reapportionment 
revolution. The institution of the Electoral College itself evidences 
the founding generation’s ambivalence, at best, toward direct democ-
racy. However, while it is true that we may have a different concep-
tion of the individual right to vote than the founding generation, as 
the founding generation struggled with the scope of their democratic 
commitments, we too wrestle with the same question. 
 In this Part, we support our contention that the fight over the 
Electoral College is in fact a fight between twin commitments to 
popular democracy and federalism. In Part III.A., we survey the case 
law evidencing the recent revival of our judicial commitment to 
states’ rights. In so doing, we demonstrate the extent to which our 
contemporary constitutional structure continues to struggle over the 
proper boundary between state and federal responsibilities. In Part 
III.B., we reveal the Court’s struggle with the right to vote.  
A.   Our Federalism 
 In the last decade, the Supreme Court has engaged in a vigorous 
debate regarding the proper limits between state and federal power. 
These debates have taken place within a doctrinal context that ex-
                                                                                                                    
 158. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1964). 
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plores the extent of Congress’s regulatory power under the Com-
merce Clause;159 Congress’ equality-enforcing power pursuant to Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment;160 and the relevance of the 
Tenth Amendment to congressional legislation purporting to com-
mandeer state legislatures.161 Further, the Court has similarly resur-
rected the doctrine of state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amend-
ment and established firm limits on Congress’s ability to facilitate 
suits by private individuals against the states in either state or fed-
eral court.162 
 The boundaries of this debate, while flexible, are clear. For the 
most part, both sides of the debate agree that our contemporary un-
derstanding of federalism has evolved from that of the founding gen-
eration.163 Moreover, with the notable exception of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, Justices on both sides of this debate have acknowledged 
that changed social, economic, and political circumstances justify a 
broader role for federal authority than the role envisioned by the 
Framers. Their disagreements boil down to two key points. First, the 
two sides differ on the existence of appropriate limitations (other 
than judicial scrutiny) on federal authority. Second, they disagree 
over the utility (or disutility) of judicial review of federal legislation 
implicating federalism concerns. 
 These competing positions have played prominent roles in recent 
years. In Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, for example, the 
majority of the Court argued that judicial review is not the proper 
method for limiting Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause.164 Instead, as Justice Blackmun argued, the states must find 
their protection from the political process.165 “[T]he principal means 
chosen by the Framers,” Blackmun  remarked, “lies in the structure 
of the Federal Government itself.”166 We think of this view as a “neo-
Federalist” position in the sense that it mirrors the thinking of those 
                                                                                                                    
 159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 160. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 161. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 162. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
 163. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J.), with id. at 583-84 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 548 (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional 
limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States . . . .”). 
 165. Id. at 550-54. 
 166. Id. at 550. “It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Gov-
ernment was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.” 
Id. at 550-51. 
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at the founding who were in favor of a strong national power and a 
lesser role for the states. 
 As then-Justice William Rehnquist predicted in his dissent in 
Garcia, such a conception of federalism and its limited notion of the 
judicial role proved to be short-lived.167 In United States v. Lopez,168 
and for the first time since the New Deal, the Court struck down an 
act of Congress as outside the congressional powers under the inter-
state commerce clause. This is the “neo-anti-Federalist” view.169 Of 
note, the five Justices responsible for this revived jurisprudence have 
offered a number of explanations in justification of their vigilant en-
forcement of states’ rights vis-à-vis Congress.170 Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft171 provides one of the 
most recent and succinct defenses of federalism in the case law. In 
Gregory, the Court provides three leading defenses. 
 First, the Court pronounces that “the principal benefit of the fed-
eralist system”172 is its ability to protect individual liberty.173 In mak-
ing this point, the majority takes its cues from none other than 
James Madison, who argued that the creation of two governments 
would ensure liberty by forcing both the state and the federal gov-
ernments to compete for the affections of the people.174 On this argu-
                                                                                                                    
 167. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 168. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 169. See Farber, supra note 15, at 1135 (“For the student of constitutional history, 
much of the rhetoric in recent Supreme Court opinions is startling. Rather than echoing 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, the Court’s language often 
seems more reminiscent of the views of their opponents.”). For an argument that the 
Court—which is fond of quoting Madison and Hamilton on questions of federalism—should 
be faithful to their character and develop a more historical, nuanced, and contextual un-
derstanding of what they stood for, see David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alex-
ander Hamilton, the Federalist, and the Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001). 
 170. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (recognizing the “established 
practice, rooted in federalism, of allowing the States wide discretion, subject to the mini-
mum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult 
problems of policy”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452 (1991); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. 
 171. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 172. Id. at 458. 
 173. Justice O’Connor wrote: 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of 
government power. . . . Just as the separation and independence of the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front. 
Id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Though on the surface the 
idea may seem counterintuitive, [federalism] was the insight of the Framers that freedom 
was enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one.”). 
 174. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.  
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ment, the Court concludes that in “the tension between federal and 
state power lies the promise of liberty.”175  
 Second, the Court exalts the now common paean to the states as 
laboratories of democracy. In Justice Kennedy’s words in Lopez, fed-
eralism permits states to “perform their role as laboratories for ex-
perimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is 
far from clear.”176  
 A third argument is grounded on some of the basic tenets of de-
mocratic theory. On this view, the Court takes public involvement in 
politics very seriously, as well as governmental responsiveness. As 
the Court wrote, the federal structure “assures a decentralized gov-
ernment that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a hetero-
geneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes.”177 Further, this structure also “allows for more 
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes gov-
ernment more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry.”178 
 All of these justifications arguably depend upon a rationale that 
seems to be foundational to the revivification of the Court’s federal-
ism jurisprudence. Underlying the Court’s federalism doctrine—or 
put less forcefully, an important component of that doctrine—is the 
conception of states as sovereign entities with dignitary interests. 
For the latter day “anti-Federalists,” the states are bearers of consti-
tutional and political rights akin to individuals.179 
 This vision is clearly evident in Justice Powell’s dissent in Garcia, 
whose position is later adopted by the Court in Lopez. Justice Powell 
asserts that the Tenth Amendment is an explicit acknowledgment 
that the states are bearers of political rights.180 As such, he ascribes 
the professed need for the Bill of Rights not on the basis of a need to 
protect the rights of individual citizens, as is commonly accepted, but 
as an explicit guarantee of state sovereignty.181 He concludes that the 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
 176. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 
U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (recognizing the “established practice, rooted in federalism, of allow-
ing the States wide discretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy”). 
 177. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.  
 178. Id.  
 179. See Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1125 
(2000). 
 180. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 181. Justice Powell maintained: 
[M]uch of the initial opposition to the Constitution was rooted in the fear that 
the National Government would be too powerful and eventually would elimi-
nate the States as viable political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly 
until proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a Bill of Rights, in-
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constitutional structure left to “the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty” that cannot be abrogated through congres-
sional legislation.182 
 It is this very vision of the states—sovereign entities with political 
rights—that Justice Blackmun attempted to undermine in Garcia by 
overruling a central underpinning of National League of Cities v. 
Usery.183 “The central theme of National League of Cities,” Justice 
Blackmun wrote, “was that the States occupy a special position in 
our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress’ authority 
under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position.”184 It is true, 
Justice Blackmun noted, that the states do retain some sover-
eignty.185 And yet, he concluded, the crucial inquiry is one of trans-
ference of power. In other words, the question of state sovereignty 
must of necessity look to the constitutional text, since states possess 
powers “only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested 
them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
Federal Government.”186 
 In spite of Justice Blackmun’s best efforts in Garcia, the reifica-
tion and personification of the states has returned with a vengeance, 
particularly so in the Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment cases.187 
Consider the following passages from Alden v. Maine: 
[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is 
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the 
Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative inter-
                                                                                                                    
cluding a provision explicitly reserving powers in the States, would be among 
the first business of the new Congress. . . . So strong was the concern that the 
proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, 
including a provision reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the 
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions 
were necessary. 
Id. at 568-69. 
 182. Id. at 570 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 
1961)). 
 183. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 184. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547. 
 185. Id. at 549. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-80 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (stating that “our federalism requires that Congress treat the 
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns,” which includes 
dignity and respect); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (not-
ing that Eleventh Amendment protects the “dignity and respect” of a state); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment 
“serves to avoid ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribu-
nals at the instances of private parties’”) (quoting Puerto Rico Aquaduct & Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 31 
(1994) (recognizing the dignitary interest of states protected by Eleventh Amendment); see 
also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, at 81, 83-84. 
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pretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from 
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States 
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they 
retain today . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as 
sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which, 
like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay 
lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. 
 . . . . 
 The federal system established by our Constitution preserves 
the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to 
them a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, to-
gether with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that 
status. 
 . . . . 
 The States thus retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” 
They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political 
corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, 
of sovereignty.188 
Without question, this is the language of a Court very committed to 
the states as sovereign entities. 
 Recognizing that the states have achieved personhood, though in-
formative, does not tell us how the Court reconciles its commitment 
to the states with its commitment to actual persons. In this vein, Pro-
fessor Farber explains that the Court’s federalism doctrine is not 
solely concerned with the dignity of the states but in fact reflects 
other concerns. As he notes, the Court’s doctrine has three goals: 
maintaining the dignity of the states, policing the federal/state 
boundary, and preserving individual rights.189 “The Court’s interest 
in states’ rights,” he concludes, “ends at the point where its commit-
ment to individual rights begins.”190 
 We agree that the Court has been willing to limit state power 
when state power conflicts with individual rights.191 However, an im-
portant distinction is worth noting. The distinction is that the Court 
has been willing to subsume its federalism concerns and modify state 
power when individual rights are at stake, as understood and defined 
by the Court.192 
 Thus, the prosopopoeia of the states sought by Justice Powell is 
not only fully achieved by the Court’s modern federalism jurispru-
                                                                                                                    
 188. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-15 (internal citations omitted). 
 189. Farber, supra note 15, at 1134. 
 190. Id. at 1140. 
 191. See id. at 1140 & nn.36, 39. 
 192. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 900 
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630 (1993).  
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dence, it is also transformed in an important way. As Professor 
Caminker observes, “[o]n its face, the particular language with which 
the Court proclaims the states’ entitlement to dignified treatment 
appears to exalt states as having a status superior to individuals.”193 
This raises two very interesting propositions. The first is, simply, 
that the states are now considered bearers of political rights, in the 
same manner that an individual citizen is a bearer of political and 
constitutional rights. These rights include an ancillary right to make 
demands on the political community. The second furthers the first. 
The political demands of the states, on the basis of their political and 
constitutional rights, can trump the rights of individuals depending 
upon the Court’s conception of the scope of the individual right. 
 With respect to the existing tension between federalism and indi-
vidual rights, a tension that gives rise to our larger thesis, Professor 
Caminker remarks that the concern for the states’ dignitary interest 
is “at odds with our foundational notion of popular sovereignty.”194 
We agree, with one modification. The Court’s federalism doctrine, as 
we have briefly presented it, is at odds with a conception of popular 
sovereignty, though not our conception of popular sovereignty.195 
 Consequently, what we lack as a society is a consensus on 
whether the state, the individual, or the federal government is the ir-
reducible unit within which lies democratic legitimacy and whose 
claims trumps all others. In this vein, we contend that while we con-
tinue to fight over these issues as a whole, the debate over the Elec-
toral College demonstrates that federalism appears to be edging out 
democracy and popular sovereignty. Put differently and perhaps 
more accurately, it may be said that, at present, the Court’s broad 
conception of federalism coexists with its narrow conception of de-
mocracy. We develop this second conception in the next section. 
B.   The Reapportionment Revolution and the Right to Vote 
 Our contemporary understanding of democracy and the right to 
vote has indubitably progressed beyond that of colonial times. To 
the extent that the English colonies recognized a right to vote, it 
was extremely limited. Almost all colonies restricted the right to 
                                                                                                                    
 193. Caminker, supra note 187, at 86. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Our slight disagreement with Professor Caminker is limited only to the choice of 
words in that particular sentence. We fully agree with the import of Professor Caminker’s 
argument. Professor Caminker goes on to state: 
[T]he view that states have self-esteem concerns suggests that states, once cre-
ated, acquire a life and interests independent of those conferred upon them by 
the people. Put differently, the notion that states are organically bestowed with 
a dignity incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states 
are mere creatures of and subservient to the truly sovereign people. 
Id. 
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vote on the basis of race. Most colonies explicitly limited the right to 
vote to freeholders. Others, in addition to expressly excluding 
nonfreeholders from the suffrage, also restricted it to men. For most 
of American history, the franchise was restricted to white male 
property-owners.196 
 Undoubtedly, our conception of the franchise has evolved from 
these early understandings. The Constitution amply reflects these 
changes. Our contemporary understanding of the right to vote in-
cludes the Civil Rights Amendments,197 the Nineteenth 
Amendment,198 the Twenty-fourth Amendment,199 and the Twenty-
sixth Amendment.200 Of note, the struggle to enfranchise women 
and voters of color has involved both the federal government and 
the Courts. 
 We may add the reapportionment cases to this list. Since the 
early 1960s and the advent of Baker v. Carr,201 the Supreme Court 
has led the way in affixing the principle of majority rule onto our 
beloved constitutional canvass. This is the now classic “reappor-
tionment revolution.” In its early rendition, the Court drew a sim-
ple and efficient line, encompassed by the words “one person, one 
vote.” This would be a flexible standard, the Court assured us; after 
all, while one man really equals one person, “one vote” really meant 
one vote “as nearly as is practicable.”202 Without question, the “one 
person, one vote” standard is widely accepted, to the point that it 
“has now been sanctified by history.”203 This is not to say, to be 
                                                                                                                    
 196. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000); Robert S. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in 
the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989). 
 197. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV. 
 198. Id. amend. XIX. 
 199. Id. amend. XXIV. 
 200. Id. amend. XXVI. 
 201. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 202. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). 
 203. Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer and 
Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29, 57 (Bernard Grofman ed., 
1990) (“[The one person, one vote doctrine] has now been sanctified by history, and is gen-
erally regarded as a resounding success.”). This point has been made often. See, e.g., 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of “One Man-One Vote,” 
1969 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 268 (“‘One man-one vote’ should be perceived as the symbol of an 
aspiration for fairness, for avoidance of complexity, for intelligibility in our representa-
tional process—indeed, for a sense of meaningful membership in the polis.”); Bernard 
Grofman & Howard A. Scarrow, Current Issues in Reapportionment, 4 LAW & POL’Y Q. 435, 
439 (1982) (“[T]he doctrine of ‘one person, one vote’ has been elevated to the status of moral 
platitude.”); C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 869, 872 (1964) (“[T]he history of democratic institutions points compellingly in 
the direction of population as the only legitimate basis of representation today.”) (quoting 
One Man, One Vote, in THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 4 (1962)). 
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clear, that “one person, one vote” is a universally accepted constitu-
tional principle.204 
 As one could expect, Baker v. Carr generated a great deal of 
scholarly writing.205 “The alarums and excursions that ensued in 
the legal-political world,” wrote Professor McCloskey soon after the 
decision was handed down, “exceeded anything evoked by a Su-
preme Court decision since 1954, and memory would have to reach 
back a good many years more to find another adequate compari-
son.”206 While some commentators applauded the Court’s decision,207 
many others, fearing the worst, attacked the ruling’s seemingly ex-
pansive reach.208 Others remained a bit more optimistic and hoped 
that the Court, instead of embarking on a direct assault on the 
states’ apportionment processes from their secluded judicial bas-
tion, would simply limit its role to the excision of only the most ex-
treme cases, where indices of “inertia and the abdication of political 
                                                                                                                    
 204. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 23-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker, 369 U.S. at 301 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 
(1980); Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One 
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 208 (E. 
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) (“One person, one vote . . . is not an 
end in itself or an equation of democracy and simple majority rule, as many members of 
the current, post-Brennan Court believe.”). 
 205. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, 
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT, at viii (1966); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., 
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS, at vii (1968); 
ROYCE HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY (1966); ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL 
REPRESENTATION 8 (1965); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One 
Vote—One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2; Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative 
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responsibility”209 were found—that is, “org[ies] of inactivity,” as 
witnessed in Tennessee.210 
 To the critics’ dismay, the Court forged ahead. In fact, the Court 
took the principle of “one person, one vote” probably as far as some 
might have feared. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,211 for example, the 
Court explained: “the ‘as nearly as practicable’ standard requires 
that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathemati-
cal equality. Unless population variances among congressional dis-
tricts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State must 
justify each variance, no matter how small.”212 Under this formula-
tion, the Court concluded, Article I, Section 2 “permits only the lim-
ited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith 
effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is 
shown.”213 Thus, in Kirkpatrick, the state’s attempt to draw its con-
gressional lines along existing political boundaries was not enough to 
justify a 5.9 percent deviation.214 In recent years, the Court has gone 
farther still; it has enforced a zero deviation standard for congres-
sional districting plans.215 
 The Court’s understanding of the right to vote and the role that 
voting played in a democratic society reached its zenith in the reap-
portionment era cases, particularly Reynolds v. Sims.216 Reynolds 
promised a tantalizingly broad conception of democracy and popular 
sovereignty where the individual is the ultimate bearer of political 
rights. The Court stated, “each and every citizen has an inalienable 
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 213. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). 
 214. Id. at 533-34. 
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right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his 
State’s legislative bodies.”217 Moreover, the Court also noted: 
[U]ndoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise 
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is a preservative of 
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of 
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.218 
For the Court in Reynolds, where the fundamental right of the indi-
vidual clashed with the states, the individual prevailed. 
 Taken at face value, Reynolds appears to be quite revolutionary. 
And yet, its reach has been cabined by tensions existing in the text 
and structure of the Constitution. These are the tensions we identi-
fied earlier. On one side of the ledger we find the states, their rights 
and interests. On the other we have the right to vote as epitomized 
by the Baker revolution. Baker and Reynolds purported to rest the 
right to vote in the individual. In contrast, certain provisions of the 
Constitution can certainly be read as resting the right to vote in the 
states. These divergent visions give rise to the tension between the 
text and structure of the Constitution and the Court’s reapportion-
ment era cases. Two recent cases illustrate this tension. We have in 
mind here the cases of Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C.  
 In Igartua de la Rosa v. United States,219 a unanimous three-judge 
panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the common-
wealth of Puerto Rico stands outside the edifice of the Electoral Col-
lege. As the Court explained summarily, the right to vote in this con-
text belongs to state legislatures under Article II. Because Puerto 
Rico is a territory and not a state, “the residents of Puerto Rico have 
no constitutional right to participate in the national election of the 
President and Vice-President.”220 For the panel, Article II ended the 
matter.221 
 However, one may take another view, as did the lower court in 
Igartua.222 Relying upon the Supreme Court’s reapportionment era 
cases, the lower court explained that voting is a fundamental right.223 
As a fundamental right, it belongs to all citizens of the United States, 
including citizens of Puerto Rico. In reaching this conclusion, the 
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court noted the “fact that Puerto Rico is subject to the Territorial 
Clause of the Constitution does not affect the fundamental right to 
vote of its residents.”224  
 The case of the residents of Washington, D.C., presents yet an-
other example of this tension. In Adams v. Clinton,225 the question 
presented was similar to that in Igartua, albeit in reference to con-
gressional representation. Put simply, do residents of Washinton, 
D.C., have a constitutional right to congressional representation? 
The answer is clearly, no. For support, the court looks to the lan-
guage of Article I, Section 2, which provides that “[T]he House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States.” On this view, only state 
citizens are allowed the right to vote for congressional representa-
tives. The District of Columbia is clearly not a state, so its citizens 
may not elect congressional representatives. The court’s concluding 
language while discussing the Equal Protection Clause is particu-
larly appropriate for our purposes. To the court, “notwithstanding 
the force of the one person, one vote principle in our constitutional 
jurisprudence, the doctrine cannot serve as a vehicle for challenging 
the structure the Constitution itself imposes upon the Congress.”226 
 Once the revolutionary dust settled, the Court played down this 
tension, as it assured us that earlier worries about its apparent will-
ingness to intrude in matters traditionally left to the states were 
unwarranted. In the end, that is, the Court explained that it had 
“adhered to the view that state legislatures have ‘primary jurisdic-
tion’ over legislative reapportionment.”227 While the Court acknowl-
edges that “reapportionment is a complicated process,”228 most of the 
reapportionment decisions are presently left to the states. For its 
part, the Court has simply ensured that enacted plans comport with 
broad constitutional guidelines. To some extent, these tensions are 
replicated in the various opinions in Bush v. Gore.229 
 Seen generally, Bush v. Gore is both an example of the Court’s 
struggle to identify the proper boundary between state and federal 
responsibilities, as well as the divisiveness of that struggle. One look-
ing to catalogue the various opinions in Bush v. Gore may situate 
them within one of the three categories stemming from the Court’s 
federalism cases: preserving individual rights; maintaining the dig-
nity of the states; or policing the boundary between federal and 
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states interests.230 In this vein, many of the Justices acknowledge the 
premise that presidential elections fall within the responsibility of 
the states.231 That is to say, on the question of whether the Constitu-
tion has granted this responsibility to the states as opposed to the 
federal government, the opinions all agree that the point of depar-
ture must be that presidential elections are assigned to the states. 
 In looking to the earlier categories, however, it soon becomes clear 
that the opinions find very few points of convergence. To begin, the 
unsigned per curiam opinion, presumably representing the views of 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, is clearly concerned about individ-
ual rights. In their own words, these Justices purport to be concerned 
with the “equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity 
owed to each voter.”232 This position sparked a debate within the 
Court as to whether individual rights are at stake or whether the 
Court should defer to the State as it attempts to fulfill its constitu-
tional obligations. 
 In turn, and rather uncharacteristically, the Justices who usually 
dissent in federalism cases in favor of greater federal power, though 
dissenting yet again, sided with the states this time. Thus, Justices 
Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter all agreed that the states, in-
cluding their own courts, should be given every opportunity to fulfill 
the duties assigned to it under the Constitution.233 Additionally, they 
suggest that if a State is unable to perform its prescribed obligations, 
the issue belongs to Congress.234 In this way, they categorically re-
jected the view that this area raises any individual rights violations 
under the Constitution.235 
 Not surprisingly, the third faction in Bush v. Gore gave us a ringing 
defense of states’ rights. To be fair, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas provided two twists to their traditional posi-
tion. First, they interpreted the meaning of “state” strictly, and in so 
doing included the state legislature while excluding the state Supreme 
Court.236 And second, they arrived at their states’ rights argument by 
emphasizing the federal interest at stake, a presidential election.237 
 How then would the Justices in Bush v. Gore answer the question 
of whether the individual, the state, or the federal government is the 
fundamental entity within which lies democratic legitimacy? Justices 
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O’ Connor and Kennedy would probably answer that democratic le-
gitimacy lies fundamentally in the individual. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia would find democratic le-
gitimacy in the state legislature. The Bush v. Gore dissenters share 
the most nuanced position. They would seem to find legitimacy in all 
three, depending upon the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
 With these competing views in hand, we come to the end of our 
road. We end with Bush v. Gore. In the case, the Court reminds us 
that we have struck a compromise between democracy and federal-
ism. On the side of federalism, the Court states in stark terms that 
the “individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for 
electors for the President of the United States unless and until the 
state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to imple-
ment its power to appoint members of the Electoral College.”238 Addi-
tionally, the “State, of course, after granting the franchise in the spe-
cial context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint elec-
tors.”239 
 On the side of democracy, it is fair to say that our commitment to 
majority rule encompasses the principle of “one person, one vote” and 
that this principle “comes closer to summarizing current notions of 
democracy in representation than any other.”240 It is clear that we 
have elevated this concept to the realm of “moral platitude.”241  
 At present however, when federalism and democracy clash or 
when notions of popular sovereignty meet the current system of se-
lecting our President and Vice President, federalism wins; the Elec-
toral College prevails. Whether rightly or not, we believe that this 
end result will continue until we achieve any consensus in the strug-
gle to accommodate democracy and federalism. As matters stand, in 
other words, the Electoral College is our default position as we 
struggle over our commitment between democracy and federalism. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: 1992 Presidential Election—Current System 
 
Candidate 
Percent 
Popular 
Vote 
Popular 
Vote 
Electoral 
Vote 
Percent 
Electoral 
Vote 
Clinton (D) 42.3 44,908,326 
 
     370 
 
69 
Bush (R) 37.9 39,103,882 
 
     160 
 
31 
Perot (Indep.) 19.6 19,741,657 
 
        0 
 
0 
 
Table 2: 1992 Presidential Election—Proportional System 
 
Candidate 
Percent 
Popular 
Vote 
Electoral 
Vote 
Percent 
Electoral 
Vote 
Clinton (D) 42.3 
 
     232 
 
       43 
Bush (R) 37.9 
 
     203 
 
       38 
Perot (Indep.) 19.6 
 
     102 
 
       19 
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Table 3: 1996 Presidential Election—Proportional System 
 
Candidate 
Percent 
Popular 
Vote 
Popular 
Vote 
Electoral 
Vote 
Percent 
Electoral 
Vote 
Clinton (D) 48.8 47,401,054 
 
     268 
 
       50 
Dole (R) 42.0 39,197,350 
 
     223 
 
       42 
Perot (Indep.) 9.1 8,085,285 
 
       45 
 
8.4 
 
